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O'Brien: Facially Neutral No-Rehires Rules and the Americans with Disabili

FACIALLY NEUTRAL NO-REHIRE RULES AND
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACTt
Christine Neylon O'Brien*

I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine a man who works as a technician for a large federal defense contractor, arriving at work with alcohol on his breath. He consents to a drug test that reveals cocaine in his system, and then quits in
the face of almost certain termination. Several years later, after getting
his act together through Alcoholics Anonymous, the former employee
reapplies to the same employer. The employer refuses to rehire him because of its universal, albeit unwritten, company policy not to rehire employees who quit rather than be fired for violation of misconduct rules.
The employee sues, maintaining that he is clean and sober and that the
employer's refusal to reconsider him once he was qualified again is a
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").' Is the employee correct?
It is common for businesses to promulgate rules regarding discipline and discharge for alcohol and illegal drug use while on duty.2 It is
also not uncommon for employers to test employees for alcohol or drugs
where the employee appears to be impaired while at work.3 Employers
often require applicants for employment to submit to such tests prior to
finalizing offers of employment.4 Certainly employers have legitimate
business concerns about safety and sobriety in the workplace. Intoxicated employees may harm themselves or others while under the influSA

version of this article was previously published at 55 Lab. L. J. 130 (2004).

Professor and Chair of the Business Law Department, Wallace E. Carroll School of Management,
Boston College. The author wishes to thank Jonathan J. Darrow, Esq., M.B.A. candidate, Carroll
School of Management, for his research and assistance.
I. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).
2. See DAVID P. TWOMEY, LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, TEXT & CASES 643 (12th ed.
2004).
3. See id. at634-36,643-44.
4. Id. at 636.
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ence of alcohol or drugs. Substance abuse of either drugs or alcohol may
be categorized as "dangerous behavior" that employers should be able to
regulate with workplace rules.' When substance abuse impairs an employee at work, it negatively impacts the quality of products produced
and services performed, and consequently, detracts from the profitability
of the business.
A flip side to the safety and economic concerns of employers is
embodied in the language and legislative history of the ADA.6 An important goal of the ADA is the reintegration into the workforce of those
who have a disability or a record of disability. 7 Included among those
protected by the ADA are rehabilitated drug or alcohol addicts, if they
are otherwise qualified for an open position. 8 Discrimination against recovered addicts is a reality. Advocates for recovered addicts note that if
job applicants admit their history of addiction, they will be rejected for
employment seventy-five percent of the time. 9 Where an employee's
disability, former disability, or record of disability correlates to previous
workplace misconduct, what protection, if any, should be afforded by
the ADA?
This paper discusses the issues involved in a recent decision of the
United States Supreme Court where an employer refused to rehire a
former drug and alcohol abuser.'0 The Court decided the case narrowly,
leaving a key question unanswered: does the ADA protect recovered
workers from broad facially neutral "no-rehire" policies?" As the peti5. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20-21, Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) (No. 02-749) (quoting Despears v. Milwaukee County,
63 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 1995)).
6. See Brief for Amicus Curiae National Employment Lawyers Association, et al. at 15,
Hernandez(No. 02-749) (discussing ADA protections and legislative history).

7. See Brief of the Betty Ford Center, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondent at
16 n.10, Hernandez (No. 02-749) (stating that "workforce participation has a significant, reinforcing
effect for recovery" and "work provides structure ... [that] interferes with addiction." (citations
omitted)).
8.
9.

Seeid. at l4-15.
Id. at 14 (quoting Alexandra Marks, Jobs Elude Former Drug Addicts, CHRISTIAN SCI.

MONITOR, June 4, 2002).
10.

Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. at 44. Petitioner Raytheon Company acquired

Hughes Missile System during the course of litigation. Id. at 47, n.l.
11. Id. at 44, 47. Plaintiff Hernandez's victory at the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit was reversed because of his procedural failure to assert the more appropriate theory of
disparate impact at the pleadings stage of his district court case. See Question Remains. Must employers rehire employees dismissedfor cause?, 27 DISABILITY COMPLIANCE BULL. No. 2, Dec. 24,

2003, LEXIS, News Library, Legal News file; Robert S. Greenberger, High Court Issues Narrow
Ruling on ADA 's Scope, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2003, at A3, A5; National Council on DisabilitySays
Partial Victory in Supreme Court's Hernandez vs. Raytheon Decision, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 3,

2003, at http://releases.usnewswire.com/GetRelease.asp?id=24032;
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tioner, Raytheon Company's, lawyer noted, "[t]housands of employers
have precisely this rule.", 2 This paper analyzes the Court's decision,
outlines what the ADA requires in this area, and recommends guidelines
for employment policies within the ambit of the ADA.
II.

FACTS AND JUDICIAL HISTORY IN RAYTHEON Co. v. HERNANDEZ

13

A. The Facts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
On July 11, 1991, plaintiff, Joel Hemandez, came to work with the
smell of alcohol on his breath. 14 Defendant, Hughes Missile Systems
Company ("Hughes"), requested that Hernandez take a blood test, which
revealed the presence of cocaine in his system.15 Hernandez, who had
worked for twenty-five years at Hughes as a janitor and later as a Calibration Service Technician, submitted his resignation in the face of certain termination. 16 Previously, in 1986, the company had allowed Hernandez to seek rehabilitation for alcoholism; after a thirty day intensive
program, he returned to work. 17 During his treatment, it was "determined
that [he] was 'alcohol-dependent,' 'cannabis-dependent,' and a 'cocaine
abuser.' 18 In 1992, Hernandez promised himself he would forswear
drugs and alcohol, and was baptized as a "faithful and active member"
of his childhood church.' 9 In addition, he regularly attended Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings between 1992 and 1995.20 On January 24, 1994,
Hernandez reapplied to the company for the position of Calibration SerGina Holland, Supreme Court Rules on ADA Employment Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, BUSINESS
NEWS, Dec. 2, 2003, at http://www.aapd-dc.org/News/legislature/scadaemp.htm.
As will be discussed, the Supreme Court decision expressly left the question certified unanswered. Hernandez,
540 U.S. at 46.
12. Gina Holland, Top Court Considers Workplace Rights: Recovering Addict Fails to Get
Job Back; Justices May Clarify Disability Act, THE DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 9, 2003, at

http://detnews.com/2003/business/0310/09/al 3-293150.htm.
13. Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 298 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and remanded sub nom. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003).
14. Hernandez, 540 U.S. at 46-47; see Jack Kilpatrick, Worker's Misconduct Fosters a Long
CourtFight, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Sept. 29, 2003,

at http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0, 1249,515034886,00.html.
15. See Hernandez, 298 F.3dat 1032.
16. Id.
17. See James J. Kilpatrick, Ruling on Ex-Drunks and CurrentLaw, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 29,
2003, at A9, availableat LEXIS, News Library.

18. Brief for Respondent at 12, Hernandez (No. 02-749).
19. Id. at 13.
20. Id. at 2.
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vice Technician or Product Test Specialist, -but his application was
summarily
rejected, purportedly because of the company's no-rehire pol21
icy.
In June of 1994, Hernandez filed a Charge of Discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").22 The
company explained its decision in its July 15, 1994 letter to the EEOC:
"[Hernandez's] application was rejected based on his demonstrated drug
use while previously employed and the complete lack of evidence indicating successful drug rehabilitation.... [tlhe company maintains it's
[sic] right to deny re-employment to employees terminated for violation
of Company rules and regulations. 2 3 In November of 1997, the EEOC
issued a Letter of Determination finding reasonable cause that the company had violated Hernandez's rights under the ADA.24
B. The United States District Courtfor the Districtof Arizona
Hernandez filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. Hughes maintained that Hernandez's application had
been rejected because of an unwritten company rule prohibiting the rehire of former employees who were terminated for any violation of misconduct rules. 25 However, Hughes's written policies provide that if a job
applicant for employment tests positive for drugs or alcohol, the applicant is only rendered ineligible for employment for the following twelve
months. 26 In February of 1999, Hughes "offered [Hernandez] the posi27
tion of Product Test Specialist if he passed the necessary examination.,
This examination was identical to the one he would have had to pass in
1994 if he had been eligible for rehire. 28 Hernandez completed only four
out of the eight sections and failed to pass any of them. 29 The district
court granted Hughes's motion for summary judgment on January 30,
2001 without an explanation of its reasons.3 °

21. Hernandez, 298 F.3d at 1032.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1033. George M. Medina, Sr., Manager of Diversity Development for Hughes,
wrote the letter for the company. Id.
24. See id.
25. Id. at 1032, 1035.
26. Id. at 1036 n.16.
27. Id. at 1035.
28. Id. at 1035 n.13.
29. Id. at 1035.
30. See Brief of the Betty Ford Center, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondent at
16 n.10, Hernandez(No. 02-749) at 20, Hernandez (No. 02-749).
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C. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
On June 11, 2002, the Ninth Circuit reversed the opinion of the district court, stating that there were genuine issues of material fact as to
whether Hernandez was qualified for the position in 1994 .3 At the time
of Hernandez's resignation in 1991, the parties agreed that he was qualified, in the sense that he was able to do the job. 32 , In 1999, however, after Hernandez filed his claim, Hughes offered him a position, but Hernandez was unable to pass the necessary examination.3 3 Whether
Hernandez would have been qualified in 1994 when he first reapplied
34
and was denied employment remained an open question for the court.
Further, the Ninth Circuit opinion noted that Hughes did not argue in its
brief on appeal that Hernandez was unqualified for failing to show that
he was rehabilitated. 35 Rather, Hernandez's letter from Alcoholics
Anonymous and his own affidavit regarding his sobriety raised a genuine issue of fact as to his rehabilitation.36
In the Court of Appeals' view, Hernandez could establish a prima
facie case of discrimination upon remand by presenting "sufficient evidence that he was not rehired by Hughes because of his record of drug
addiction or because he was perceived as being a drug addict, as well as
demonstrating that he is qualified for the position he seeks. 37 Because
the court found that Hernandez made out such a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifted to Hughes to proffer "a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions., 38
Further, the Ninth Circuit held that "even if it were correct that
Bockmiller [a Hughes employee who evaluated Hernandez's employment application] was not aware of Hernandez's record of drug addiction at the time she rejected his application, Hughes's decision not to re31. Hernandez, 298 F.3d at 1035. The opinion was amended on denial of rehearing en banc
on August 12, 2002. Id. at 1031-32.
32. See id. at 1035.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1035 n.15.
36. Id. The court also reviewed the evidence from Raytheon's human resource person, Ms.
Bockmiller, who rejected Hemandez's application. The court noted that it "permits an inference
that she was aware of Hernandez's positive drug test [and thus did] not eliminate the question of
fact that arises as a result of Hughes's explicit statements to the EEOC that the application was rejected because of Hernandez's prior drug addiction." Id. at 1034.
37. Id. at 1033. The court noted that Hemandez could receive damages if he were qualified
for the position in 1994, even if he were no longer qualified when he was tested in 1999. Id. at 1035
n.14.
38. Id. at 1035.
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employ him because of his prior 'termination' would violate the
ADA. 3 9 The court also stated that "Hughes's unwritten policy [was]
not a 'legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' for its rejection of Hernandez's application., 40 They expressed concern that such a policy violated
the ADA as applied to individuals like Hernandez, 4' and found fault
with a "blanket policy against rehire" that would result in a staff member
42
making an employment decision without knowing about a disability.
Nevertheless, even though the court held that "a policy that serves to bar
re-employment of a drug addict despite his successful rehabilitation violates the ADA, 43 they still affirmed the district court's44ruling that "Hernandez failed to timely raise a disparate impact claim.",
D. The United States Supreme Court

1. The Question
On February 24, 2003, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez.45 The question certified to the
Court was "whether the [Americans with Disabilities Act] confers preferential rehire rights on employees lawfully terminated for violating
workplace conduct rules. 4 6 Oral arguments were heard on October 8,
200347 and the Court issued its decision on December 2, 2003.48 During
the oral arguments, one Justice expressed more concern over the Ninth
Circuit's rule that "where you have such a [no-rehire] policy, it will not
be applicable to someone who's a rehabilitated drug addict," than with
the factual disputes underlying the grant of summary judgment. 49 Another member of the Court boldly stated, "I don't care about all these
factual controversies., 50 The questions and statements to counsel during
the arguments brought into focus what at least some members of the

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 1036.
Id.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.

Id. at 1036-37.

Id. at 1037 n.20.
537 U.S. 1187 (2003).
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 46 (2003).
Oral Argument at 20, Raytheon Co. v. Hemandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) (No. 02-749).
Hernandez, 540 U.S. at 44.
Oral Argument at 31-32, Hernandez (No. 02-749).
50. Id. at 48.
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Court considered to be the important issue underlying the case: whether
the ADA is violated by a company's refusal to consider for reemployment a formerly-discharged employee who later reapplies, when
the prior discharge was due to misconduct, and the misconduct was related to illegal drug use.5'
2. The Decision
Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion of the Court, with all
joining except for Justice Souter, who took no part in the decision, and
Justice Breyer, who recused himself prior to consideration of the case.52
The Court vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the
case because the court of appeals "improperly applied a disparate impact
analysis in a disparate treatment case. 5 3 The Court explicitly did not
reach the question certified.54 Rather, the opinion reviewed the facts in
the case, and noted that the EEOC's letter found that there was reasonable cause to believe that Hernandez was denied rehire because of his
disability. 55 In addition, the Court pointed out that throughout discovery,
Respondent Hernandez relied upon the theory that the company rejected
him because of his record of drug addiction.5 6 In fact, Respondent only
raised the alternative theory of disparate impact in response to Petitioner's motion for summary judgment, and therefore the district court.
did not consider the theory because it was not raised in a timely manner.5 7 The court of appeals agreed with the district court on this point.58
The Supreme Court criticized the court of appeals because it applied the traditional burden-shifting paradigm for disparate treatment
cases, but found that the employer policy had a disparate impact, thereby

51. See id. at 6, 10, 31-32. One member of the Court asked "whether the Ninth Circuit's
treatment of the no-rehire policy was correct under ADA law." Id. at 6. Another member of the
Court questioned the attorney for the petitioner as to how a qualified applicant who has a "history of
drug or alcohol use and was fired for that years ago," but who is rehabilitated and thinks that the
rule barring discrimination against those with handicaps "requires [the employer] to make a special
accommodation for him" could be turned down. Id. at 10. Another Justice noted that "the reason
we have this case is that it is a very important proposition of law ... that where you have such a
[no-hire] policy, it will be applicable to someone who's a rehabilitated drug addict." Id. at 31-32.
52. Hernandez, 540 U.S. at 45.
53. Id. at 46.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 46-48.
56. Id. at 49.
57. Id.
58. See id.
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combining the two frameworks. 59 The Court explained that in disparate
treatment cases, the protected trait is a motivating factor in the decisionmaking process of the employer, whereas in disparate impact cases, a facially neutral employment practice impacts a protected group without
justification by "business necessity. ' 60 While both of these claims are
valid under the ADA, "courts must be careful to distinguish between
Since the only theory available to Hemandez was
these two theories.'
disparate treatment, Raytheon's neutral no-rehire policy provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to rehire him.62
Therefore, the only way for Hernandez to succeed under a disparate
treatment theory would be to convince a jury that Raytheon made its
upon Hernandez's disability status despite
employment decision based
63
its claims to the contrary.
The Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that because the misconduct was related to his disability, Raytheon's refusal to
rehire respondent violated the ADA. 6 4 It noted that the Ninth Circuit exhibited flawed reasoning when stating that Raytheon's policy violates
the ADA because employees such as Ms. Bockmiller may make employment decisions while unaware of a disability.65 If an employer had
no knowledge of the respondent's disability status, the disability could
not motivate the employment decision, and thus no disparate treatment
claim would be available.6 6
3. Analysis
The Supreme Court could not allow the decision of the Ninth Circuit to stand because it was decided on the wrong theory, namely disparate impact rather than the available disparate treatment analysis. Because counsel for Hernandez failed to raise a disparate impact claim
initially, Hernandez was left with only a disparate treatment claim,

59. See id. at 51-52.
60. Id. at 52-53.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 53-55. The Court characterized the no-rehire policy as a "quintessential legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to rehire an employee who was terminated for violating
workplace conduct rules." Id.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 55 n.6 (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993) (rejecting a
similar claim in an Age Discrimination in Employment Act case)).
65. Id. at 520 n.7 (citing Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 298 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th
Cir. 2002)).
66. Id.
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which he could not substantiate. And yet, the court of appeals applied a
disparate impact analysis in order to find for the Plaintiff. For this reason, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, ruling that its analysis of the impact of the employer's
policies was incorrect for a disparate treatment claim, and that it should
have considered the discriminatory intent of the employer.67
In addition, the Ninth Circuit made bold assertions that were not
supported by the well-settled law of employment discrimination. 6' The
Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration under the appropriate analysis. The lower courts must abide by the Supreme Court's
explicit finding that "a neutral no-rehire policy is, by definition, a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason under the ADA., 69 Therefore, under
well-established precedent, the only issue left to determine is whether
Respondent can produce sufficient evidence to show that the reason offered by Petitioner was pre-textual. 70 The Supreme Court deferred to the
Ninth Circuit's determination that there were genuine issues of material
fact remaining as to whether Hernandez was qualified for the position
and whether Raytheon's refusal to rehire him was because of his past record of drug addiction.7 1 In addition, the Court did not disturb the Ninth
Circuit's conclusion that Hernandez had set forth sufficient evidence of
genuine, issues of material fact so as to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination (thereby precluding summary judgment), because Raytheon did not challenge this finding.72 Thus, upon remand to the trial
court, Hernandez's first hurdle will be to establish that he was qualified
for the position for which he applied in 1994.
Thereafter, Raytheon will likely assert its unwritten no-rehire rule
as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason- for its refusal to rehire Hernandez. The existence of such a policy or whether it served as grounds
to deny Hernandez's application may be questioned, but the Supreme
Court made clear that if such a policy exists, it is "a quintessential legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to rehire an employee
who was terminated for violating workplace conduct rules. 73 Therefore, if Raytheon can show that its decision not to rehire Hemandez was

67.

See id. at 55.

68. See id. at 53-54 (asserting as a matter of law that "the neutral no-rehire policy was not a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason sufficient to defeat a prima facie case of discrimination.").
69. Id. at 51-52.
70. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973)).
71. Id. at 50.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 54-55.
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in fact based on "a neutral, generally applicable no-rehire policy" then
its decision "can, in no way, be said to have been motivated by respondent's disability. 7 4 The Court noted that upon remand, if the facts are
established that Raytheon's employee, Bockmiller, was indeed unaware
of Hernandez's record of disability, then she could not have refused to
rehire him because of his past record of drug addiction, and thus no disparate treatment claim would lie.75
4. Decision of the Ninth Circuit upon Remand
On March 23, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit issued its decision upon remand from the United States
Supreme Court.7 6 The only question upon remand was "whether there
was 'sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that [Raytheon] did make its employment decision based on [Joel Hernandez's]
status as disabled' despite its proffered explanation., 77 The Ninth Circuit once again reversed the. district court's grant of summary judgment
for Raytheon, thus answering the question in the affirmative. 78 The
court noted the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, referring to
the conflicting testimony of Ms. Bockmiller, who rejected Hernandez's
application in 1994, and the reasons recited for rejecting Hemandez in
the letter sent by George Medina, Raytheon's Manager of Diversity Development. 79 The court also indicated that jurors could find Raytheon's
changing rationales for its rejection of Hernandez as evidence of pretext.8 °
Further, the court questioned the very existence of a uniform norehire policy for those fired because of misconduct, wondering why such
a policy was not in writing in light of the "extensive set of written per81
sonnel policies covering various subjects, including substance abuse,,'
and noted that there was no mention of the policy by Raytheon until after EEOC conciliation efforts concluded and the litigation ensued. 82 The
74. Id. The Court's statement regarding the employer's motivation relates directly to the disparate treatment standard, and does not indicate that a facially neutral no-rehire policy that is generally applied could never have a disparate impact upon protected individuals.
75. Id. at 55 n.7.
76. Hemandez v. Raytheon Co., 362 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 2004).
77. Id. at 565 (quoting Hemandez, 540 U.S. at 53).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 568-69.
80. Id. 569.
81. Id.at 567.
82. Id. at 569.
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Ninth Circuit also withdrew one footnote from its earlier opinion in the
case because it "overstated the record" with respect to the existence of
Raytheon's purported no-rehire policy. 83 The court of appeals reversed
and remanded the case to the trial court since "Hernandez ha[d] presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could determine
that Raytheon refused to re-hire him because of his past record of addiction and not because of a company rule barring re-hire of previously
terminated employees., 84 In light of the Supreme Court's decision in the
Raytheon case, the trial court's analysis will be85limited to the narrow
question of whether disparate treatment occurred.
III. THE REMAINING QUESTION: WILL A NO-REHIRE RULE SURVIVE A
DISPARATE IMPACT CHALLENGE?

Because the United States Supreme Court decided the case on the
basis of Hernandez's claim as presented, the important issue regarding
the ultimate legality of a neutral-on-its-face "no-rehire" policy was not
addressed by the Court. Such a policy may be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason on its face, yet the impact of the policy on those protected
by the ADA is a separate issue. The news sources touted the Raytheon
case as one of the most closely watched business cases of the Supreme
Court Term, a case with implications for "more than five million workers with substance abuse problems. 8 6
The Supreme Court explicitly did not reach the question for certiorari, the wording of which was somewhat startling in that it queried
"whether the ADA confers preferential rehire rights." 87 Before the Raytheon opinion was issued, it seemed unlikely that the current Court
would endorse a preferential rehire right for former drug abusers, particularly since such a right would interfere with an employer's rights to
discipline and discharge employees in order to enforce a drug free work-

83. Id. at 570 n.5 (referring to Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 298 F.3d 1030, 1036
n. 17 (9th Cir. 2002)).
84. Id. at 570.
85. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 55 (2003) (concluding that on remand the
Ninth Circuit may only consider disparate treatment, not disparate impact).
86. Gina Holland, Top Court Considers Workplace Rights: Recovering Addict Fails to Get
Job Back; Justices May Clarify Disability Act, THE DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 9, 2003, at
http://detnews.com/2003/business/0310/09/al 3-293150.htm.
87. Hernandez, 540 U.S. at 46; see generally Andrew J. Ruzicho & Louis A. Jacobs,
DistinguishingMotivation From Impact, 27 EMP. PRAC. UPDATE 1 (2004) (discussing how the

ADA does not confer "preferential rehire rights").
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place.88 As the Petitioner argued in its Brief, under the ADA, the disabled are entitled to an equal opportunity, not "a second chance that others would not get.",89 Yet during oral arguments, one of the Justices remarked that an employer's duty of reasonable accommodation is
"always a discrimination in favor of the applicant." 90
Even without resolution of the larger question by the Supreme
Court in Raytheon, employers should prepare themselves for a future,
properly-pled disparate impact case. Employers' policies, such as norehire rules, should be carefully reviewed and revised where necessary
to comply with the preexisting framework of equal employment opportunity law. Many companies have no-rehire policies. Raytheon maintained that such policies are so usual that they need not be in writing,
and implied that this was why its policy was not written. 91 Employers
are on notice of the limits to the "nondiscriminatory reason" defense
provided by a facially neutral rule, namely that if the rule disproportionately affects and thus discriminates against protected individuals, the
employer must show that it is justified by business necessity. 92 It is of
interest that the U.S. Solicitor General's Brief in Support of Petitioner
Raytheon conceded that a policy prohibiting the rehiring of employees
discharged for misconduct could perhaps give rise to ADA liability under certain circumstances, because instead of analysis under disparate
treatment, "such
a policy would be properly analyzed as a disparate im93
claim.,
pact

88. This seems particularly true in light of the fact that Justices Breyer and Souter did not take
part in the Raytheon decision. See Hernandez, 540 U.S. at 45. The notion of equal opportunity is
one thing, but the label of 'preference' smacks of reverse discrimination.
89. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, Raytheon Co. v.
Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) (No. 02-749).
90. Oral Argument at 13, Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) (No. 02-749).
91. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Hernandez (No. 02-749). It should also be noted that federal contractors such as Raytheon are required to take steps to prevent workplace drug use under the DrugFree Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. §§ 701-707. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council in Support of Petitioners at 12-13, Hernandez (No. 02-749).
92. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 78 (2002) (finding that the ADA
"creates an affirmative defense for action under a qualification standard 'shown to be job-related for
the position in question and ... consistent with business necessity."') (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)
(2000)).
93. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16-17, Hernandez
(No 02-749).
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. PertinentCase Law
Raytheon is not the first case to address an employer's refusal to
rehire an employee discharged for misconduct, where the conduct was
caused by an ADA-protected disability. In Harris v. Polk,94 a county attorney's office declined to rehire a legal stenographer based on an office
policy against employing individuals with criminal records. The employee had been fired four years earlier after pleading guilty to a shoplifting charge. 95 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the
employee's argument that, since her shoplifting and resulting criminal
record were caused by a mental illness from which she had now recovered, the ADA prohibited using this criminal record as a basis for rejecting her bid for re-employment. 96 The Eighth Circuit ruled that "an employer may hold disabled employees
to the same standard of law-abiding
97
employees.,
other
all
as
conduct
The rationale of Harris is buttressed by a Seventh Circuit case in
which a maintenance worker was demoted from a position that required
a driver's license to one that did not. 98 The demotion followed the revocation of the employee's driver's license after he was convicted a fourth
time of driving under the influence of alcohol. 99 While conceding that
alcoholism was a contributing cause of the employee's drunk driving,
the court distinguished between the disability of alcoholism and the decision to drive under the influence:
[A]lcoholics are capable of avoiding driving while drunk.... To impose liability [on the employer] under the Americans with Disabilities
Act... in such circumstances would indirectly but unmistakably undermine the laws that regulate dangerous behavior. It would give alcoholics.., a privilege to avoid some of the normal sanctions for
criminal activity ....The refusal to excuse, or even alleviate the punishment of, the disabled person who commits a crime [caused by his
disability] ... is not "discrimination"... [W]e do not think it is a rea100
sonably required accommodation to overlook infractions of the law.

94.

103 F.3d 696 (8th Cir. 1996).

95.
96.
97.

Id. at 696.

98.

Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635, 635 (7th Cir. 1995).

Id. at 697.
Id.

99. Id.
100.

Id. at 636-37 (internal citations omitted).
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Similarly, it could be argued that allowing employees discharged
for disability-related misconduct to apply for rehire where non-disabled
employees could not, would allow them to avoid some of the normal
sanctions associated with workplace rules that regulate and prohibit dangerous behavior, thereby undermining such rules. Hemandez, like the
maintenance worker in Despears, chose to come to work under the influence of drugs and alcohol. His disability may have contributed to his
propensity to consume alcohol and drugs, but it did not compel him to
report to work in an intoxicated state, thereby violating a company rule
and possibly creating danger in an industry where safety is a large concern.
The Solicitor General made some compelling arguments in its Brief
Supporting the Petitioner in the Raytheon case. 10 1 It is clear that the
ADA's provisions spell out an employer's right to prohibit the illegal
use of drugs and alcohol at work and to "hold an employee who engages
in the illegal use of drugs or who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job performance and behavior that
such entity holds other employees, even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the drug use or alcoholism of such employee." 10 2 This right includes the ability to test for illegal drug or
workplace alcohol use, and make employment decisions based on the
test result.10 3 Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,10 4 one can argue that there is.no legal problem, at
least under a disparate treatment claim, with making an employment decision based upon misconduct that is correlated with a disability, if an
analytical distinction can be made between the two.'0 5 However, in
Hazen Paper, just as in the Raytheon case, the plaintiff only claimed
disparate treatment, 10 6 and therefore, the Court also focused on whether
101. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11, 13, 18, Hernandez (No 02-749) (citing the ADA language that permits employers to hold alcoholics and drug addicts to the same standards as other employees. Id. at 13; arguing that the refusal to excuse punishment of the disabled person who engages in misconduct is not discrimination, but rather is a refusal
to discriminate in their favor. Id.; asserting that the lower court's holding will disrupt legitimate
workplace rules designed to promote safety and productivity. Id. at 18; contending that applying a
facially neutral policy that prohibits rehiring of former employees who were discharged for misconduct does not constitute "misconduct" prohibited by the ADA. Id. at 11.).
102. Id. at 3-4 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(l)-(2) & (4) (2000)) (emphasis added).
103. Id. at4 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12114(d)(2)).
104. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
105. Id. at 609-610. The Court in Hazen Paper distinguished, in a disparate treatment claim,
the illegality of an employer's decision that was motivated by age versus the legality of the same
decision motivated by something other than the protected trait under the ADEA. Id.
106. Id. at610.
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the protected trait actually motivated the employer's decision. The
Hazen PaperCourt noted that the employee could not succeed on a disparate treatment claim "unless the employee's protected trait actually
played a role in that process [of decision-making] and had a determinative influence on the outcome." 10 7 Once again, the question that remains
is how a facially neutral rule, such as a no-rehire rule, will fare when met
with a disparate impact challenge.
The Disparate Impact Framework
Hernandez' s only available ground for relief was a claim for disparate treatment because he had failed to timely plead disparate impact.
However, there is no question that a disparate impact claim is "cognizable under the ADA."108 This claim is made available by the language of
the statute itself, which provides:
the term "discriminate" includes [both] ... utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration.., that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability [and] ... using qualification standards,
employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out, or tend to
screen out, an individual with a disability ... unless the standard, test
or other selection criteria.., is 0shown
to be job-related ... and is con9
sistent with business necessity.
...

In general, a plaintiff who seeks to establish a prima facie case of
disparate impact "must show: (1) the occurrence of certain outwardly
neutral practices, and (2) a significantly adverse or disproportionateimpact on persons of a particulartype produced by the defendant's facially
neutral acts or practices."' 1 0 A neutral no-rehire policy of the type described in Raytheon would clearly meet the first required showing. To
establish significantly adverse or disproportionate impact in an employment discrimination context, "plaintiffs are ordinarily required to include
111
statistical evidence to show disparity in outcome between groups."'
Certainly a plaintiff challenging a facially neutral no-rehire rule on the
basis of its disparate impact would need to establish statistical evidence
107. Id.
108. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003).
109. 42 U.S.C. §12112(b) (2000).
110. Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep't, 352 F.3d 565, 574-75 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Reg'l
Econ. Cmty. Action Program v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 52-53 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 813 (2002)).
111. Id.
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of the policy's disproportionate impact upon the protected group. An
employer could then defend its actions by demonstrating that the policy
did not cause a disparate impact, or that the rule was job related and consistent with business necessity.'2
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to protect themselves from ADA claims, companies should
maintain written policies that apply fairly and evenhandedly to those
who are members of protected groups. The advantages of a written policy include that a company avoids questions as to whether such a policy
exists, and reduces factual inquiries to matters such as whether the
clearly acknowledged policy was applied uniformly and consistently,
and in a nondiscriminatory manner.' 13 Also, when a written policy is
distributed to existing employees, it puts them on notice of disciplinary
consequences, such that if misconduct is serious and leads to termination, rehire will not be an option. Employees who have knowledge of
rules are more likely to obey them and to be legally bound by them.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that Raytheon's
unwritten no-rehire policy placed former employees such as Hernandez
in a worse position than a new applicant who tested positive for drugs or
alcohol at the time of hiring. This was so because a new applicant to
Raytheon would be barred from employment for twelve months, while
former employees were permanently barred. Should former employees
be treated less favorably than new applicants? An argument can be
made that employment policies should place a person like Hernandez in
the same position as a new hire for purposes of employment consideration. After all, former employees are already trained, and by virtue of
their experience, are of more value than a new applicant. Thus, it could
be argued that a person should be able to apply for a position for which
he is qualified, despite prior problems that have since dissipated, and
should not be barred from applying for a job for any longer than a new
applicant who is similarly situated.
Arguments against treating former employees the same as prospective employees can also be made. One argument relates to the fact that
current employeeshave notice of company rules and the consequences
for violation, whereas prospective employees generally do not. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, what clout does an employer's

112.
113.

See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 78 (2002).
See discussion supra Part II.D.3.
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disciplinary code have if employees can circumvent it by quitting and
reapplying after termination? No-rehire rules encourage employee compliance with workplace conduct rules. Companies need to maintain drug
and alcohol free environments and to some extent, the threat of termination is the ultimate consequence that may keep current employees sober
and drug free. A blanket no-rehire rule also saves an employer from
dealing with many former employee applicants individually, a process
that can be time consuming and expensive.
Nonetheless, perhaps the best hiring/rehiring policy for an employer to promulgate would include an individualized inquiry rather than
a blanket no-rehire rule. Otherwise, there is some probability that an
employer will encounter difficulties with its no-rehire rule pursuant to a
disparate impact theory under the ADA." 4 If an employer refuses to depart from its facially neutral no-rehire rule, inevitably there will be a disabled individual who will challenge the policy that automatically bars
her opportunity to seek a position for which she is otherwise qualified,
and to receive reasonable accommodation where such is not an undue
hardship to the employer. 1 5 After the Raytheon decision, such a facially
neutral rule will generally withstand a disparate treatment challenge.
Even under a disparate treatment analysis, however, an employer may
encounter the same legal pitfalls, whether using a no-rehire rule or not.
This is so because once an employer has knowledge of an applicant's
disability or record of disability, or is perceived as having a disability,
there is often a question raised by an applicant as to whether the decision
not to hire or rehire was motivated by the. disability, using a disparate
treatment theory."16 If the decision is deemed not to have been based
upon illegal motivation, but rather is illustrated by the employer to involve a legitimate business reason, then there is no duty to reasonably
accommodate the disabled person, unless he or she can establish that the
business reason defense was a pretext.' 17 Facially neutral no-rehire rules

114. See id.
115. This is not to say that a former employee would be successful with such a challenge, even
under disparate impact analysis, particularly if the former employee has received progressive disci-

pline, and, despite opportunities for rehabilitation and employee assistance programs, has repeatedly
violated work rules that resulted in her termination for misconduct. At some point, an individual's
recidivism will defeat re-entry, particularly to the same workplace. Neither arbitration proceedings

under the guidance of a collective bargaining agreement, nor most federal circuits following the
mandates of the ADA, would reinstate an individual who is not truly rehabilitated. Even if there is

evidence of an applicant's successful rehabilitation, an employer's work rules prohibiting rehire
after repeated serious misconduct may ultimately qualify as job related and a business necessity.
116.
117.

See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53-55 (2003).
See id.
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will withstand this disparate treatment analysis unless a plaintiff establishes improper motivation with respect to the business decision.
Under a disparate impact analysis, facially neutral no-rehire rules
are more problematic, and thus, are more likely to result in litigation if
employers continue to insist upon them. While the Supreme Court in
Raytheon characterized a neutral no-rehire rule as a legitimate business
reason, this is not the same thing as saying that such a rule is a business
necessity. If a facially neutral no-rehire rule is shown to have a disparate
impact on protected individuals, the employer must show that the rule is
job related and consistent with business necessity in order to defend its
use.1 18 However, the Supreme Court did not provide guidance on this
issue, so there is some question as to whether employers may need to reconsider recovered individuals, essentially bending the rules to accommodate the disabled, or those who have a record of disability, since the
discrimination against recovered drug and alcohol adADA prohibits
19
dicts.
In the long run, the use of an individualized inquiry into an applicant's qualifications and abilities may be a better approach than a facially neutral rule that routinely bars qualified individuals who have disabilities that are protected by the ADA. If an employer maintains
facially neutral employment policies, they should be designed to withstand a traditional disparate impact challenge, not merely the disparate
treatment analysis regarding motivation or intent that applied to Hernandez. While Raytheon may win upon remand to the trial court, this is
largely because disparate impact analysis is unavailable to Hernandez.
Raytheon sought to avoid problems in one clean swipe, by having a
blanket rule against rehire. Whether Raytheon and other employers
could successfully defend a similar case against a disparate impact challenge is the important question now, and one that should evoke some reassessment and revision of current employment policies. Employers
who wish to retain facially neutral no-rehire rules should determine the
impact of such facially neutral policies on protected groups, and also
evaluate whether such policies are, in earnest, a business necessity.

118. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 78 (2002).
119. See Hernandez,540 U.S. at 46.
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